Comment: Solving the Depraved Heart Murder Problem in Maryland: A Suggestion for Successful Prosecution of Police Officers by Norfolk, Rachele
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 3 Article 6
5-2017
Comment: Solving the Depraved Heart Murder
Problem in Maryland: A Suggestion for Successful
Prosecution of Police Officers
Rachele Norfolk
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
This Peer Reviewed Articles is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Norfolk, Rachele (2017) "Comment: Solving the Depraved Heart Murder Problem in Maryland: A Suggestion for Successful
Prosecution of Police Officers," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 46 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol46/iss3/6
 547 
SOLVING THE DEPRAVED HEART MURDER PROBLEM IN 
MARYLAND: A SUGGESTION FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PROSECUTION OF POLICE OFFICERS 
  Rachele Norfolk*        
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is true that we have grown adroit at feigning astonishment 
at the episodic convulsions of violence in American cities, 
but that doesn’t make them any less predictable or their 
roots any less apparent.  With the exception of the riots that 
followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., every 
major riot by the black community of an American city 
since the Second World War has been ignited by a single 
issue: police tactics.1 
After police officers arrested Freddie Gray and he died in their 
custody, riots erupted in Baltimore City, as people from across the 
world watched through their television screens.2  Rioters 
outnumbered police officers as clashes between the two occurred; 
meanwhile, stores were being looted and buildings were either 
vandalized or burned to the ground.3  Hundreds of people were 
involved in the riots; schools shut down, streets closed, and 
businesses sent workers home.4  The city and the nation “unleashed a 
maelstrom of unrest” out of outrage and want for answers after 
 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S., Paralegal 
Studies, 2014, Stevenson University.  Special thanks to my parents for always 
encouraging me to follow my dreams, and to Chris, for his endless love and support. 
1. Jelani Cobb, City Life, NEW YORKER (May 11, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/city-life-what-racism-has-done-to-
baltimore.  Police argue that their aggressive tactics are to reduce high rates of crime 
and violence and are “a hallmark of civic concern,” rather than a sign of callous 
disregard.  Id. 
2. Kevin Rector, Scott Dance & Luke Broadwater, Riots Erupt: Baltimore Descends 
into Chaos, Violence, Looting, BALT. SUN (Apr. 28, 2015, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-police-student-
violence-20150427-story.html#page=1. 
3. Id.  
4. Id.  
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Freddie Gray’s death, leaving police officials to explain what 
happened, or failed to happen, in this case.5  
As lawyer and protest planner Malik Shabazz indicated, there was a 
“burn behind the burn” in Baltimore due to ongoing police brutality 
nationally.6  Two months prior to the Freddie Gray incident, FBI 
Director James Comey indicated in an address to students at 
Georgetown University that Americans had to face some “hard 
truths” about the killings of black men by police officers.7  Director 
Comey explained that police officers of any race exhibit “‘mental 
shortcuts’ that become ‘almost irresistible’ when most of the suspects 
they arrest are black males.”8  This can lead to the assumption that 
any black man is a potential criminal, and social science research 
indicates that even black officers are susceptible to reacting in such a 
manner.9  
Former President Barack Obama, speaking at a press conference 
after the death of Freddie Gray, stated that there have been too many 
instances where officers’ interactions with individuals have raised 
some troubling questions.10  He continued saying, “[I]t comes up . . . 
 
5. Justin Fenton, Gray Suffered Head Injury in Prisoner Van, Sources Familiar with 
Investigation Say, BALT. SUN (Apr. 30, 2015, 11:01 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-gray-
investigation-completed-20150430-story.html. 
6. Jonathan Pitts, Shabazz Plans Rally for Thousands Saturday, BALT. SUN (Apr. 28, 
2015, 8:37 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/breaking/bs-md-shabazz-
saturday-20150428-story.html. 
7. Editorial, ‘Everyone’s a Little Bit Racist,’ BALT. SUN (Feb. 17, 2015, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-comey-race-20150217-
story.html.  While the focus of this Comment will not center on racial issues between 
arrestees and police officers, it is important to note the conscious or unconscious 
racial biases that exist and influence conduct toward African American men in 
arrestee situations. 
8. Id. 
9. Id.  One journalist describes the criticism as not of the police per se, “but as a symbol 
of an entire web of failed social policies, on education, employment, health and 
housing.”  Cobb, supra note 1.  In 2014, there were 211 murders in Baltimore, and 
189 of the victims were black males.  Id.  Cobb exclaims that “Baltimore doesn’t 
have a homicide problem; it has a black-male-death problem.”  Id. 
10. Cobb, supra note 1; see also Olevia Boykin et al., A Better Standard for the Use of 
Deadly Force, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opini
on/a-better-standard-for-the-use-of-deadly-force.html?_r=1. 
American police officers killed 74 unarmed black people in 
2015.  From January through July, according to The Washington 
Post, unarmed black men were seven times more likely than 
unarmed white men to die by police gunfire.  An analysis of F.B.I. 
data from 2010 to 2012 concluded that the police killed black men 
ages 15 to 19 at a rate 21 times greater than the statistic for white 
men the same age.  Department of Justice numbers indicate that a 
 
2017 Solving the Depraved Heart Murder Problem 549 
 
once a week now, or once every couple of weeks. . . . [T]his has been 
a slow-rolling crisis.  This has been going on for a long time.  This is 
not new, and we shouldn’t pretend that it’s new.”11 
Perhaps some justice for this not-so-new phenomenon may come in 
the form of charging police officers for misconduct, as was done in 
the Freddie Gray case.12  However, this is only half of the battle.  The 
other half comes from a successful prosecution.13  One of the six 
officers charged in the death of Freddie Gray, Caesar Goodson, was 
charged with second-degree depraved heart murder,14 but he was 
ultimately not convicted.15  
Currently, there is no statutory framework for depraved heart 
murder in Maryland.16  Additionally, there is a problem with 
prosecuting this specific kind of murder because Maryland’s common 
law provides very vague and somewhat flimsy guidance.17  While 
prosecuting police officers may prove to be a challenging feat itself, 
it may be even harder when an officer fails to follow certain 
procedures or act in certain ways through “acts of omission.”18  
This Comment will proceed in four parts following this 
introduction.  Part II will provide background information on the 
Freddie Gray case19 and the common law in Maryland on depraved 
 
black person is about four times as likely to die in custody or 
while being arrested than a white person is. 
 Boykin et al., supra note 10. 
11. Cobb, supra note 1.  
12. Jean Marbella, Six Baltimore Police Officers Charged in Freddie Gray’s Death, 
BALT. SUN (May 2, 2015, 12:16 AM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-freddie-gray-
mainbar-20150501-story.html. 
13. See Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/t
housands-dead-few-prosecuted/.  
14. Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Officer Caesar Goodson, Facing the Most Serious 
Charges in Death of Freddie Gray, Heads to Trial, BALT. SUN (June 5, 2016, 6:13 
PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-caesar-
goodson-freddie-gray-trial-preview-20160605-story.html; see also Marbella, supra 
note 12.  
15. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.  
16. Robinson v. State, 517 A.2d 94, 100 (Md. 1986). 
17. See infra Section II.B.1. 
18. Omission is defined as “[a] failure to do something: esp., a neglect of duty.” 
Omission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).    
19. For purposes of this Comment, the facts used when discussing the Freddie Gray case 
come from information provided by the Baltimore Police Department, statements 
made by Baltimore City State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby, and in court testimony as 
chronicled in numerous newspaper articles and other sources.  See, e.g., Brandon 
Longo, Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest to His Final Spinal Cord Injury, CBS BALT.
 
550 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
heart murder and the lesser-included offense of involuntary 
manslaughter.20  The problematic ambiguities in the current law will 
be explored when applying the common law to the prosecution of 
Officer Caesar Goodson.21  Part III will explore statutes that prove 
helpful and provide guidance for a possible statutory framework.22  
Part IV explores various tort concepts, such as common carrier 
liability and professionals’ higher duty of care in certain 
circumstances, with the intention to borrow from these concepts for a 
successful prosecution of a police officer charged with depraved 
heart murder.23 
Part V proposes a statute for depraved heart murder, using existing 
criminal statutory schemes as a guide.24  The proposed statute uses a 
totality of the circumstances approach, combining the current 
common law on depraved heart murder with tort theories.25  
Essentially, this recommended framework will proffer that when an 
officer takes someone into care who can no longer take care of 
himself, the officer owes a higher duty.26  More specifically, the 
standards and training to which police officers must adhere, the 
restraint on freedom of movement in police custody providing for a 
vulnerable victim, and evidence that one is suffering from a medical 
emergency and the failure to respond can be examined in this totality 
approach.27  This Comment will analyze the Freddie Gray facts to 
demonstrate how the statute would operate in depraved heart murder 
prosecutions.28 
II.  THE FREDDIE GRAY CASE AND THE DIFFICULTY OF A 
SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION UNDER THE THEORY OF 
DEPRAVED HEART MURDER 
Malice in the context of “depraved heart” murder is not entirely 
clear.29  While the common law attempts to shed light on what 
 
 (June 23, 2016, 2:28 PM), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/06/23/timeline-
freddie-grays-arrest-to-his-fatal-spinal-cord-injury/.  This Comment uses these facts 
to demonstrate how to apply the proposed theory of prosecution in a hypothetical 
situation.  
20. See infra Sections II.A–B.   
21. See infra Section II.C. 
22. See infra Part III.  
23. See infra Part IV. 
24. See infra Section V.A.  
25. See infra Section V.A. 
26. See infra Sections V.A–B. 
27. See infra Section V.B.  
28. See infra Section V.B.  
29. See infra notes 75–80, 88–92 and accompanying text.  
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circumstances elevate this type of unintentional murder to stand on 
parallel footing with an intentional killing, the use of vague terms and 
the interchanging of those terms to define the lessor-included offense 
of involuntary manslaughter add to the uncertainty.30  The facts 
surrounding the death of Freddie Gray illustrate the problems with 
the existing law on depraved heart murder, specifically problems 
concerning the failures to act and what level of culpability should be 
attached to each of those omissions.31 
A. Facts of the Freddie Gray Case 
Freddie Gray was a 25-year-old African American who was 
apprehended and arrested after fleeing when encountering police 
officers.32  According to Baltimore City State’s Attorney Marilyn 
Mosby, “Mr. Gray suffered a severe and critical neck injury as a 
result of being handcuffed, shackled by his feet, and unrestrained 
inside [a Baltimore City Police Department] wagon,” dying a week 
later.33  The driver of the police van, Officer Caesar Goodson Jr., was 
charged with second-degree depraved heart murder, while the other 
officers were charged with lessor offenses.34 
When Gray was arrested, he was handcuffed behind his back.35  He 
indicated that he could not breathe and requested an inhaler but was 
denied medical care, placed into the van, and never secured by a seat 
belt.36  While en route to central booking, the van stopped four 
 
30. See infra notes 75–77, 95 and accompanying text.  
31. See discussion infra Sections II.A–B, Part V.  
32. David A. Graham, The ‘Depraved-Heart Murder’ of Freddie Gray, ATLANTIC (May 
1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/05/the-depraved-heart-
murder-of-freddie-gray/392132/.  
33. Id. 
34. Id.   
Officer Caesar R. Goodson Jr., the driver of the van, was 
charged with second-degree murder, three counts of manslaughter 
and assault.  Lt. Brian W. Rice was charged with manslaughter, 
assault and false imprisonment.  Sgt. Alicia D. White and Officer 
William G. Porter were charged with manslaughter and assault.  
Officers Garrett E. Miller and Edward M. Nero were charged with 
assault and false imprisonment.  All were charged with 
misconduct in office.  
 Marbella, supra note 12.  
35. Justin Fenton, Six Baltimore Police Officers Indicted in Death of Freddie Gray, 
BALT. SUN (May 21, 2015, 9:29 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-freddie-gray-
officer-indictments-20150521-story.html. 
36. See id. 
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times.37  During the first stop, Gray was removed from the van and 
flex cuffs were placed on his wrists and leg shackles on his ankles, 
after which he was placed into the van on the floor on his stomach.38  
Officer Goodson stopped the van a second time to “check on Gray”; 
he did not render medical assistance.39  
The van stopped for a third time numerous blocks away so that 
Goodson could check on Gray’s status.40  According to Marilyn 
Mosby, “Mr. Gray at that time requested help and indicated that he 
could not breathe.”41  Furthermore, “Officer Porter asked Mr. Gray if 
he needed a medic, at which time Mr. Gray indicated at least twice 
that he was in need of a medic.”42  Officer Porter had just arrived on 
the scene, but neither he nor Officer Goodson rendered or requested 
medical assistance.43  According to testimony, “Porter . . . told 
Goodson that Central Booking wouldn’t accept Gray. . . . [and] that 
he wasn’t sure if Gray was faking it to avoid going to jail.”44  Officer 
Goodson then proceeded to make a fourth stop after there had been a 
request “over departmental dispatch to pick up an additional 
suspect”;45 he then picked up an arrestee from that location.46  At the 
fourth stop, Officers White, Porter, and Goodson opened the doors of 
the van and found Gray unresponsive,47 and still, no medical 
assistance was rendered or summoned.48  Upon arrival at the police 
station, and after the other prisoner was secured inside, Gray was 
 
37. See Graham, supra note 32.  The stop at central booking was considered the fifth and 
final stop.  Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Michael E. Ruane, Excerpts from Baltimore State’s Attorney Marilyn J. Mosby’s 
Statement, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/excerpts-from-baltimore-states-attorney-
marilyn-j-mosbys-statement/2015/05/01/5faf08fe-f027-11e4-8abc-
d6aa3bad79dd_story.html?utm_term=.39c107681807. 
42. Id.; see also Application for Statement of Charges at 3, State v. Goodson, No. 
6B02294452 (Md. Dist. Ct. Balt. City May 1, 2015).  
43. Graham, supra note 32.  
44. Longo, supra note 19.  
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id.  While the State claimed Gray was found unresponsive at this time, Officer Porter 
denied it, but did admit that Gray indicated that “he still needed help at this stop.  
Porter says [he] told Sgt. White that Gray needed medical help.  No medic was 
called.”  Id. 
48. Id. 
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found not breathing.49  On April 19, 2015, Gray was pronounced 
dead.50  
Freddie Gray’s autopsy report surmised that Gray suffered from 
neck and spinal injuries.51  During the stop to pick up the additional 
prisoner,52 Gray was found “slumped over” and could only make 
“minimal responses to direct questions.”53  The injury to his spinal 
cord would have had “direct effects” on Gray’s ability to breathe.54  
According to Dr. Morris Marc Soriano, Gray’s “‘brain would have 
likely survived’ had he been given a breathing tube 
sooner . . . . Instead, Gray suffered a ‘hunger for air’ as his condition 
deteriorated . . . .”55  
According to the autopsy, the police van’s sudden deceleration 
most likely caused this “high-energy injury.”56  Gray’s death was 
ruled a homicide because of the failure of the officers “to follow 
safety procedures ‘through acts of omission.’”57  According to a 
Baltimore Police Department policy directive, officers “shall ensure 
the safety of a detainee when a person is taken into custody, 
including obtaining medical treatment when necessary, at the nearest 
emergency medical facility,” and “all passengers, regardless of age 
and seat location, shall be restrained by seat belts or other authorized 
restraining devices.”58 
 
49. Application for Statement of Charges, supra note 42, at 5.  
50. Id. 
51. Justin Fenton, Autopsy of Freddie Gray Shows ‘High-Energy’ Impact, BALT. SUN 
(June 24, 2015, 10:25 AM) [hereinafter Fenton I], 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-
autopsy-20150623-story.html.   
52. Id.  This article considers the stop where Gray was placed in leg restraints as a 
second stop, indicating that the first stop is when Gray was placed in the van 
initially.  However, this Comment and other sources do not consider the initial pick 
up of Gray as a “stop.”  See Graham, supra note 32.  
53. Fenton I, supra note 51.  But see Longo, supra note 19 (indicating that Gray’s exact 
condition at this time was in dispute).  
54. Fenton I, supra note 51. 
55. Kevin Rector & Justin Fenton, Prior Back Injury Alleged as Officer’s Trial in 
Freddie Gray Case Moves Forward, BALT. SUN (Dec. 7, 2015, 9:45 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-porter-trial-
monday-20151207-story.html. 
56. Fenton I, supra note 51.  
57. Id.  Allan, Assistant Medical Examiner, testified during Officer Porter’s trial that she 
would not have ruled the death a homicide had medical care been sought for Mr. 
Gray during the fourth stop of the van.  Rector & Fenton, supra note 55. 
58. Editorial, Baltimore Police, Seat Belts, & Freddie Gray, BALT. SUN (Oct. 19, 2015, 
2:32 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-gray-van-seat-
belt-20151019-story.html.  The “policy [i.e., internal regulation] had only taken 
effect nine days before Gray’s arrest and had been emailed to officers as part of a 
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From the autopsy result, it appears as if there may have been abrupt 
changes in the direction of the van.59  Because of the wrist and ankle 
restraints, Gray was at risk for unsupported falls when the van would 
accelerate or decelerate.60  According to the report, there were not 
any previous injuries to Gray’s spine.61  A video of Gray’s arrest 
shows that Gray was able to bear weight on his legs and speak while 
police officers loaded him into the van, suggesting the arrest itself 
was not the cause of the injuries sustained.62 
Importantly, Assistant Medical Examiner Carol Allan noted that it 
was “not an unforeseen event that a vulnerable individual was injured 
during operation of the vehicle, and that without prompt medical 
attention, the injury would prove fatal.”63  Following the Freddie 
Gray incident, FOX31, a Denver television station, conducted an 
investigation using a van and mimicking a sheriff’s department 
vehicle.64  It used a certified crash test dummy and took a video.65  
The video shows, at various speeds, that the dummy slid across the 
bench seat and hit its skull, denting a steel barrier.66  
Despite the charges the officers faced, none of them was convicted 
of even a single crime.67  Judge Williams “questioned the legal 
theories put forth by prosecutors.”68  While the defense offered 
conflicting testimony by its own expert about the timeline of Gray’s 
injuries, Judge Williams found there to be “equally plausible 
 
package of directives six days after that.”  Id.  However, “cutting down on such 
injuries through the use of seat belts has been a departmental priority since 
2012 . . . . [T]he department stressed the need to seat belt detainees in 
communications with commanders, conducted training on the issue and performed 
spot checks for compliance.”  Id. 
59. Fenton I, supra note 51. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. See id. 
63. Id. 
64. Mark Puente, ‘Rough Rides’ a Problem in Denver, Television Investigation Finds, 
BALT. SUN (Nov. 14, 2015, 2:18 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-sun-
investigates-denver-roughrides1115-20151113-story.html. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with Zero 
Convictions Against Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016, 8:57 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-
motions-20160727-story.html.  After the acquittal of three of the officers, the 
prosecutors dropped the cases against Officer Miller and Sgt. White.  Id.  The second 
case against Porter was also dropped, after his first case ended with a hung jury.  Id. 
68. Id. 
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scenarios” and determined that because the injuries were internal, it 
would have been difficult to determine if Gray was in fact injured.69  
B. Depraved Heart Murder Background 
 1.   What is Depraved Heart Murder?  
In Maryland, murder is a single crime that is divided into two 
degrees by statute,70 of which second-degree murder has multiple 
alternative mentes reae.71  According to Maryland case law, there are 
four types of second-degree murder:   
[F]irst, the killing of another person, other than by poison or 
lying in wait, with the intent to kill but without the 
deliberation and premeditation required for first-degree 
murder; second, the killing of another person with the intent 
to inflict such serious bodily harm that death would be the 
likely result; third, “depraved heart murder,” . . . and fourth, 
“murder committed in the perpetration of a felony other than 
those enumerated in the first-degree murder statutes.”72 
There is no depraved heart murder statute in Maryland.73  In fact, 
1975 marked the first time that the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
identified depraved heart murder by its name, with a fuller analysis 
not developed until 1981.74  
“[D]epraved heart murder is a category of homicide that has 
consistently resisted descriptive definition, and the vague standards 
 
69. Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Freddie Gray Case: Officer Caesar Goodson Jr. Not 
Guilty on All Charges, BALT. SUN (June 23, 2016, 9:01 PM) [hereinafter Fenton & 
Rector I], http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-
goodson-verdict-20160623-story.html.  
70. Owens v. State, 906 A.2d 989, 1027 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (quoting Burch v. 
State, 696 A.2d 433, 454 (Md. 1997)), aff’d, 924 A.2d 1072 (Md. 2007).  By virtue 
of the Maryland Criminal Code, all murders that are not in the first degree, as 
defined under Section 2-201, are deemed murder in the second degree.  MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-204 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016). 
71. Owens, 906 A.2d at 1027.  
72. Jones v. State, 114 A.3d 256, 261–62 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (quoting Thornton 
v. State, 919 A.2d 678, 688 (Md. 2007)), cert. granted, 120 A.3d 766 (2015).  
73. Robinson v. State, 517 A.2d 94, 100 (Md. 1986). 
74. Dan Rodricks, Dan Rodricks: From Gang Killing to Gray Case, the Book on 
Depraved-Heart Murder, BALT. SUN (July 13, 2015, 6:25 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-rodricks-0714-20150713-
column.html. 
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employed have caused persistent problems.”75  The Maryland Law 
Encyclopedia defines depraved heart murder as “a killing resulting 
from the deliberate perpetration of a knowingly dangerous act with 
reckless and wanton unconcern and indifference as to whether 
anyone is harmed.  It is the killing of another person while acting 
with an extreme disregard for human life.”76  Depraved heart murder 
has also been defined as “extremely negligent conduct,” creating both 
an “unjustifiable” and “very high degree of risk,” which causes the 
death of another.77  
Maryland case law mirrors these treatises using essentially the 
same descriptions, noting that the critical feature is the manifestation 
of an extreme indifference to the value of human life.78  The 
descriptions of willful and wanton are used, with “willful” meaning 
the perpetrator should have reasonably realized the risk his behavior 
created,79 and “wanton” being conceptualized as evincing “an 
element of viciousness or contemptuous disregard for the value of 
human life.”80 
Depraved heart murder is included on a “matrix of blameworthy 
states of mind that will support a verdict of either civil liability or 
criminal guilt.”81  On this matrix, there are three degrees of fault 
involved in negligent conduct: non-criminal negligence, “involuntary 
manslaughter of the gross negligence variety,” and “second-degree 
murder of the depraved heart variety.”82  Depraved heart murder 
manifests the highest level of blameworthiness on this “culpability 
ladder.”83  For a depraved heart murder conviction, there is no 
requirement of express malice, or an intent to kill; rather, it is an 
implied and variant form of malice that the common law treats as 
equally blameworthy as specific intent because of the high level of 
indifference to human life.84  
 
75. Alan C. Michaels, “Rationales” of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judgmental 
Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54, 85 (2000). 
76. 12 M.L.E. Homicide § 22 (2016) (footnote omitted).  
77. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.4 (2d ed. 2016).  
78. Robinson, 517 A.2d at 101.  
79. Id. at 98 (quoting RICHARD P. GILBERT & CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND 
CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1.6-3 (1983)). 
80. Id. (quoting GILBERT & MOYLAN, supra note 79).  
81.  Pagotto v. State, 732 A.2d 920, 923 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999), aff’d, 762 A.2d 97 
(2000).  
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Alston v. State, 643 A.2d 468, 472–73 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (quoting 
DeBettencourt v. State, 428 A.2d 479, 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)), aff’d, 662 
A.2d 247 (1995). 
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 2.   The Blurry Line Between Depraved Heart Murder and 
Involuntary Manslaughter in Maryland 
While the definitions of depraved heart murder are sufficiently 
vague on their own, one’s understanding becomes even more 
complicated when examining the definition of involuntary 
manslaughter.  By definition, involuntary manslaughter involves 
“‘gross deviations’ from the standard of care used by an ordinary 
person where the negligent conduct can reasonably be said to 
manifest ‘a wanton or reckless disregard of human life.’”85  While 
there is a difference between murder and manslaughter,86 as evident 
from the two different crimes, Maryland case law has yet to draw a 
meaningful distinction.87  The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
stated that judges and jurors can either sense or feel the difference 
between the two “relatively easily on a case-by-case basis.”88 
However, the reality is that “[t]he borderline between [depraved 
heart murder and involuntary manslaughter] is, in the present state of 
[Maryland] case law, a very blurred line.”89  The distinctions are 
based upon degrees of risk, and there is “no exact boundary line 
between each category; they shade gradually like a spectrum from 
one group to another.”90  Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 
attempt to differentiate between second-degree depraved heart 
murder and involuntary manslaughter.91  However, the instruction for 
depraved heart murder indicates that the “defendant’s conduct 
[created] a very high degree of risk . . . and the defendant, [conscious 
of that risk], acted with extreme disregard of the life-endangering 
consequences,” while involuntary manslaughter requires that the 
State prove “the defendant, conscious of the risk, acted in a grossly 
negligent manner . . . that created a high degree of risk to human 
life.”92  
 
85. Pagotto, 732 A.2d at 923 (first quoting Dishman v. State, 721 A.2d 699, 704 (Md. 
1998); and then quoting State v. Albrecht, 649 A.2d 336, 348 (Md. 1994)).  
86. See id. at 923–24.  
87. Id.; see also Dishman, 721 A.2d at 708 (“[O]ur cases have not drawn a precise line 
between depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter.”).  
88. Pagotto, 732 A.2d at 925 n.2 (suggesting that the court’s members adopt Justice 
Stewart’s words in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 
(1964): “I know it when I see it.”).  
89. Williams v. State, 641 A.2d 990, 997 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).  
90. Id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 
7.4 (2d ed. 1986) (current version at LAFAVE, supra note 77)). 
91. See MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 4:17.8 (2d ed. Supp. 2016).  
92. Id. 
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Essentially, the two crimes are almost identical to one another, the 
difference lying in the heightened mens rea for depraved heart 
murder.93  Adding to the overall confusion, Maryland courts have 
defined both crimes by using the terms “reckless”94 and “wanton.”95  
Additionally, depraved heart murder does not require a specific intent 
to kill another person, and there is no requirement that more than one 
life be placed in danger.96  Essentially, judges and jurors must then 
determine what acts manifest a high degree of risk from a very high 
degree of risk.97  The language of manifesting an extreme 
indifference or disregard to human life has been used to try to help 
jurors, “in ordinary language,” understand the task that is before 
them.98  Some examples of conduct that rose to the level needed for 
depraved heart murder range from shooting into a moving 
automobile, playing Russian roulette, selling “pure” heroin, and 
firing a bullet into an occupied room.99  Juries had to walk a blurry 
line and decide under which degree of risk these actions fell.100  Thus, 
not only are the terms used to define each crime vague, but the 
courts’ use of the same exact terms to define each crime adds an extra 
layer of uncertainty for jurors.  
C. Problems in Relation to the Gray Case 
One of the main issues in the Freddie Gray case, as Officer Porter’s 
attorney recognized, was whether the failure of a police officer to 
seatbelt someone in custody rises to the level of recklessness and is 
such a gross departure from the standard of conduct of a reasonable 
police officer that it can rise to the charge of second-degree 
 
93. Ashe v. State, 726 A.2d 786, 790–91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (noting that a 
defendant must act with extreme disregard as opposed to a grossly negligent 
manner).  
94. Dishman v. State, 721 A.2d 699, 708 (Md. 1998); see also Robinson v. State, 517 
A.2d 94, 97 (Md. 1986) (stating that depraved heart murder involves “the willful 
doing of a dangerous and reckless act”); Duren v. State, 102 A.2d 277, 280 (Md. 
1954) (stating that involuntary manslaughter requires “reckless disregard for human 
life”). 
95. Robinson, 517 A.2d at 97 (“[Depraved heart murder] involves the deliberate 
perpetration of a knowingly dangerous act with reckless and wanton unconcern and 
indifference as to whether anyone is harmed or not.” (quoting DeBettencourt v. 
State, 428 A.2d 479, 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981))); State v. Albrecht, 649 A.2d 
336, 348 (Md. 1994) (“[I]nvoluntary manslaughter must be gross or criminal, viz., 
such as manifests a wanton or reckless disregard of human life.” (quoting Mills v. 
State, 282 A.2d 147, 149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971))). 
96. 12 M.L.E. Homicide § 22, supra note 76. 
97. LAFAVE, supra note 77. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. See id. 
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murder.101  This goes hand-in-hand with two of State’s Attorney 
Marilyn Mosby’s repeated themes in the charging of the officers 
involved: “that the handcuffed and leg-shackled Gray was never 
secured by a seatbelt in the police wagon against police policy, and 
that officers ignored repeated appeals for medical help from Gray.”102  
Additionally, the timing of the injury proved to be an issue, as it was 
difficult for the judge to tell if there was adequate notice for Goodson 
to understand the severity of Gray’s injuries.103 
The challenge is that it seems impossible to properly determine 
whether Officer Goodson’s conduct exhibited the requisite high level 
of disregard required by Maryland common law.104  It seems difficult 
to assess whether the actions manifest a willful and wanton disregard 
for human life, when examples of depraved heart murder seem so 
egregious, such as firing a bullet into an occupied room.105  More so, 
how does one determine whether this conduct exhibits a very high 
degree of risk, or merely a high degree of risk resulting in the lessor 
charge of involuntary manslaughter?106  A look to civil law may 
provide some guidance.107 
III.  MODELS OF EXISTING STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
DETERMINING MENS REA 
Currently, there are criminal statutory schemes that are used to help 
distinguish between similar states of mind.108  There is a need for a 
similar framework for second-degree depraved heart murder in order 
to show various levels of culpability that are per se conduct evincing 
a depraved heart, or that can be combined to ratchet up from an 
 
101. Justin Fenton, Freddie Gray Officers Renew Challenge to Seatbelt-Related Charges, 
BALT. SUN (Oct. 21, 2015, 8:54 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-gray-motion-
seatbelt-charges-20151021-story.html (noting further that this is not a matter of a 
simple ride in the back of a police cruiser, but “involves the risk to a prisoner created 
by transporting him in a police vehicle resembling a steel cage without a seatbelt —
 while his hands and legs are physically restrained from movement”). 
102. Marbella, supra note 12.  Former Police Commissioner Anthony Batts even 
acknowledged that Gray should have been buckled into the transportation vehicle 
and that there are no excuses for this failure to act.  Luke Broadwater, Baltimore 
Police Acknowledge Mistakes in Freddie Gray’s Death, BALT. SUN (Apr. 24, 2015,  
10:31 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-freddie-gray-
protest-prepare-20150424-story.html. 
103. Fenton & Rector I, supra note 69. 
104. See supra Section II.B.1. 
105. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.  
106. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
107. See infra Part IV. 
108. See infra Section III.A. 
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involuntary manslaughter conviction to a depraved heart murder 
conviction.109  
A. Helpful Statutory Formulations 
As mentioned, supra, there is no depraved heart murder statute in 
Maryland.110  However, there are statutory schemes in place where 
legislatures have imported negligence theories to hold someone 
accountable for the unintentional death of another person (i.e., drunk 
driving that causes the death of another) and have inserted higher 
penalties for conduct that is seen as more egregious.111 
Section 2-503 of the Maryland Code is the criminal statute for 
homicide by motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
under the influence of alcohol per se.112  Under this statute, if a 
person causes the death of another “as a result of the person’s 
negligently driving, operating, or controlling a motor vehicle or 
vessel while: (1) under the influence of alcohol; or (2) under the 
influence of alcohol per se,” the person is guilty of a felony and is 
subject to imprisonment not exceeding five years, or a fine not 
exceeding five thousand dollars, or both.113  Section 2-504, however, 
is a statute for homicide by motor vehicle or vessel while impaired by 
alcohol.114  If a person causes the death of another as “a result of the 
person’s negligently driving, operating, or controlling a motor vehicle 
or vessel while impaired by alcohol,” he is guilty of a felony and is 
subject to up to three years in prison, a fine of up to five thousand 
dollars, or both.115  The difference between the two statutes is the 
amount of alcohol that the person who caused the death consumed.116  
Influence per se, in Section 2-503, is defined as a blood alcohol 
concentration of 0.08 or more.117  The legislature drew a line with 
this number as to what level of alcohol is sufficient for a higher 
penalty.118 
Similarly, Section 2-210 is a statute for when a person causes the 
death of another by operation of a vehicle or vessel in a criminally 
negligent manner.119  For purposes of this statute, a person acts in a 
 
109. See infra Part V.  
110. See supra notes 16, 73 and accompanying text.  
111. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-503–2-504 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016).   
112. Id. § 2-503 (emphasis added). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. § 2-504 (emphasis added).  
115. Id. 
116. See id. §§ 2-503–2-504. 
117. Id. § 2-501 (LexisNexis 2012).  
118. See supra notes 112–15, 117 and accompanying text. 
119. CRIM. LAW § 2-210 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016). 
2017 Solving the Depraved Heart Murder Problem 561 
 
criminally negligent manner when he should be aware that his 
conduct is causing a substantial and unjustifiable risk and the 
person’s failure to perceive that risk “constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that would be exercised by a reasonable 
person.”120  A violation of this statute, however, is classified as a 
misdemeanor, with the penalty being “imprisonment not exceeding 3 
years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both.”121  
Accordingly, it appears that a person who drinks alcohol while 
operating a vehicle is more culpable than a person who merely acts in 
a criminally negligent manner when no alcohol consumption is 
involved and the death of a person results.122  However, if a person 
operates or controls a vehicle in a grossly negligent manner, as 
opposed to a criminally negligent manner, the person commits 
manslaughter by vehicle, and the resulting penalty is a felony with 
“imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 
or both.”123  
These statutes and the resulting penalties depend on the various 
levels of culpability (i.e., impairment) versus being at the “DUI” 
level of 0.08 blood alcohol concentration, or being criminally 
negligent versus grossly negligent.124  These statutes serve as models 
and show that there is a method for distinguishing between degrees of 
criminal negligence.  The difference in conduct in each of these 
statutes goes to how much a person knew or should have known he 
was a risk to another human.  Likewise, it seems viable that there 
could be a statutory presumption of misconduct for depraved heart 
murder. 
IV.  POSSIBLE RESOLUTION WITH THE IMPORTATION OF 
TORT THEORIES 
In formulating a similar statute for depraved heart murder, tort 
theories should be applied because they illustrate the policy rationale 
behind the proposal.125  Tort law recognizes certain circumstances 
where a higher duty of care is owed; specifically, these circumstances 
 
120. Id. § 2-210(c).  
121. Id. § 2-210(f).  
122. See supra notes 111–17 and accompanying text. 
123. CRIM. LAW § 2-209 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016). 
124. See supra notes 111–17, 119–21 and accompanying text.  
125. It is not necessarily that they fall within these torts categories, but that these specific 
relationships give rise to liability in a tort context and are thus why police officers in 
this very specific context should be charged.  
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involve common carriers and certain professionals.126  This Comment 
argues that certain tort theories are not only helpful for understanding 
when a police officer’s conduct rises to the level to be found 
criminally negligent, but should also be implemented in drafting a 
depraved heart murder statute.127  Borrowing from these concepts 
provides a standard of care presumption for when a police officer 
takes a citizen into custody because the citizen essentially loses the 
ability to care for himself.128  These concepts can help identify what 
the duty owed should be, and a totality of the circumstances approach 
can help to establish the culpability of the police officer and whether 
there was a high degree of risk involved in his behavior versus a very 
high degree of risk involved when a person dies in his custody.129  
A. Common Carrier  
Common carriers transport persons and must serve the public on an 
equal basis.130  As statutorily defined by Section 1-101(e)(1) of the 
Public Utilities Article, common carriers include car and taxicab 
companies, transit companies, motor boat companies, etc.131  
Common carriers owe passengers “a duty to deliver them to their 
destination as expeditiously as possible, consistent with safety.”132  
This duty is more than ordinary care.133  Because common carriers 
have passengers, and the passengers’ safety of their “lives and limbs” 
is at stake, a carrier must “exercise the highest degree of care which 
is consistent with the nature of its undertaking. . . . [and] is bound to 
employ the utmost care and diligence which human foresight can 
use.”134  The higher degree of care is sound from a public policy 
standpoint “where the security of a person is frequently involved 
under circumstances in which the carrier controls movement or 
equipment.”135  While the vehicle is in motion, there may be 
negligence if passengers are imperiled by the jerking or jarring of the 
 
126. See infra Sections IV.A–B. 
127. See infra Part V.  
128. See infra Part V. 
129. See infra Part V. 
130. 4 M.L.E. Carriers § 1 (2016). 
131. Id. at Carriers § 2. 
132. Id. at Carriers § 33.  
133. Id. at Carriers § 45.  
134. Id.; see also Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Seymour, 847 A.2d 973, 997 (Md. 
2005) (“A common carrier owes its passengers the highest degree of care to provide 
safe means and methods of transportation for them.” (quoting Todd v. Mass Transit 
Admin., 816 A.2d 930, 934 (Md. 2003))).  
135. 4 M.L.E. Carriers § 45, supra note 130.  
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vehicle, including sudden starts or stops, if they are deemed 
extraordinary.136  
B. Professionals and Their Duties 
If a defendant is of a professional status, the defendant’s duty of 
care may not be merely that of ordinary or reasonable care.137  
Lawyers, doctors, and other professionals “owe their clients the care 
provided or generally accepted as the standard by qualified 
practitioners in the same profession.”138  A leading treatise on tort 
law recognizes that courts speak of duties within a certain list of 
formal relationships, including the carrier-passenger relationship, but 
notes that a relationship need not fit into a certain formalized 
category per se.139  Duty, according to Dobbs, “is a question of 
justice and policy, [and] some less formal or describable relationships 
may work in the same way.”140  
 1.   Custodians and Duties 
A person who is in custody of another is owed a duty of reasonable 
care from foreseeable harms that may arise,141 which includes any 
self-destructive behavior.142  Jailers as custodians, for instance, 
exercise control over inmates by virtue of legal authority.143  Dobbs 
specifically mentions that this also applies to an officer who has a 
person in his custody.144  The same principle extends to hospitals and 
patients, parents and children, and schools and students.145  Even 
more importantly to the discussion at hand, custody has taken on the 
definition of the deprivation of a person’s liberty “so that he could no 
longer protect himself or obtain aid from others.”146 
 
136. See id. at Carriers § 67.  
137. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 284 (2d ed. 2016). 
138. Id. (“Given a recognized risk, all reasonable persons should use the knowledge and 
skill at their disposal.”).  
139. Id. § 415. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. § 418. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. (noting that the jailer has a duty to prevent suicide, for instance). 
144. Id.  In fact, Officer Novak testified during Officer Porter’s trial that “van drivers are 
understood to have ‘primary custody’ of detainees in their vehicles.”  Kevin Rector 
& Justin Fenton, Officer Porter Takes the Stand in Trial in Freddie Gray’s Death, 
BALT. SUN (Dec. 9, 2015, 9:47 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/f
reddie-gray/bs-md-porter-trial-wednesday-20151209-story.html. 
145. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 137, § 418. 
146. Id. § 419. 
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V.  APPLICATION OF TORT THEORIES TO EXISTING 
COMMON LAW FOR DEPRAVED HEART MURDER 
The only way to resolve the problem of depraved heart murder is 
for the Maryland Legislature to pass a new criminal statute.  The 
formulation of a statute that provides for conduct that is per se the 
level of mens rea needed to convict a police officer of depraved heart 
murder will be helpful for a successful prosecution when a citizen 
dies in his custody.147  Common law does not adequately address 
what conduct exactly satisfies the malice needed for depraved heart 
murder.148  The Freddie Gray case is a prime example: how is a 
factfinder to decide whether the defendant possessed the mens rea for 
depraved heart murder when the law provides nothing to help 
distinguish it from involuntary manslaughter?149  The Legislature 
should draft a depraved heart murder statute that describes specific 
conduct that rises to the needed level.150  The above mentioned tort 
theories provide the policy rationale for drafting the statute; the 
police officer has a special relationship to someone in his custody, 
and someone in custody cannot readily take care of himself.151 
A. Proposed Statute 
Second-Degree Depraved Heart Murder: 
 
A person may not cause the death of another while acting 
with an extreme disregard for human life.  Conduct creating 
a very high degree of risk, evincing an extreme disregard of 
the life endangering consequences is presumed if the death 
occurs: 
(1) While failing to comply with an internal regulation, 
coupled with: 
(a) Failing to provide adequate care in rendering aid to an 
individual in custody; and 
(b) Having an opportunity to provide aid. 
 
147. See infra Sections V.A–B. 
148. See supra Section II.B. 
149. See supra Section II.C. 
150. See infra Sections V.A–B.  
151. See generally Jeremy Daniel Kernodle, Policing the Police: Clarifying the Test for 
Holding the Government Liable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the State-Created 
Danger Theory, 54 VAND. L. REV. 165, 184–85 (2001) (justifying state-created 
danger cases under a “special relationship” theory, in which an individual loses his 
self-protection when placed in police custody and is essentially helpless). 
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This proposed statute helps to solve the problem of vague depraved 
heart common law standards.  This concept is not new in criminal 
law (e.g., the statutes regarding DUIs resulting in death).152  
Importantly, the statute is not necessarily specific to police officers 
because it may be useful in other situations where a death results 
involving similar professionals with responsibility.153  There needs to 
be better police policy, and a statute such as this one will help to 
ensure that the policy is followed. 
B. Application to the Gray Facts 
The prosecutor can begin by tallying the acts of omission by 
Officer Caesar Goodson.  When first placed in the van, Gray asked 
for and was denied medical assistance.154  Additionally, he was 
placed into the van on the floor and was not buckled into a seat, per a 
Baltimore City internal regulation requiring the use of seatbelts on 
people in custody.155  During the third stop, Officer Goodson failed to 
render aid or request medical assistance after Gray explicitly 
indicated to Officer Porter that he was in need.156  During the fourth 
stop, Officer Goodson found Gray in an unresponsive state but 
headed toward the police station rather than the hospital.157  First, 
after violating the regulation, Officer Goodson had an opportunity 
with each stop to correct his mistake.158  Additionally, despite 
whether Goodson was aware of the severity of Gray’s injuries, it was 
brought to his attention several times that Mr. Gray may have been in 
need of medical assistance.159  Still, Officer Goodson failed to render 
aid even a single time.160  
 Additionally, Officer Goodson was acting in his professional 
capacity as a police officer.161  What would have been generally 
accepted in his profession would have been adherence to the 
regulation to seat belt detainees.162  Officer Goodson, regardless of 
 
152. See supra Part III. 
153. For example, the statute could perhaps be applicable to jailers.  
154. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
156. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.  
157. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.  
158. See supra notes 37–48 and accompanying text.  
159. See supra notes 36, 39–42, 47–48 and accompanying text.  
160. See supra notes 36–48 and accompanying text.  
161. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
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this mandate, would have been apprised of the expectation to use 
seatbelts.163 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Successful prosecution under the theory of depraved heart murder 
is challenging, due to ambiguities in the law.  The challenge is 
amplified when a police officer is charged with failure to act.164  The 
proposed depraved heart murder statute, supra, shows conduct that 
per se evinces an extreme indifference to human life.165  Legislatures 
have distinguished between varying degrees of culpability when 
someone causes a death while consuming alcohol at a certain level.166  
The proposed statute, too, shows conduct that rises to a level above 
involuntary manslaughter.167  
Tort theories provide rationales for holding certain people more 
responsible than others because of their profession and their 
relationship to citizens in their care and custody.168  This is mirrored 
in the police officer context because of the relationship and power 
differential when one is in custody and the officer’s professional duty 
to comply with regulations and act as other officers would act in 
similar circumstances.169  This, combined with a second egregious 
act, such as failure to provide aid to someone in need when there is 
an opportunity to provide that aid, is enough to hold someone of this 
standing guilty of depraved heart murder.  The proposed statute 
should be implemented to ensure successful prosecutions when a 
citizen dies in a professional’s custody, regulations were not adhered 
to, and medical aid was not given when needed.  
 
 
 
163. See Baltimore Police, Seat Belts and Freddie Gray, supra note 58. 
164. See supra Section II.C. 
165. See supra Section V.A. 
166. See supra Section III.A. 
167. See supra Section V.A. 
168. See supra Part IV. 
169. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
